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Abstract
...Even though eliminating malaria from the endemic margins is a part of the Global Malaria Action Plan, little
guidance exists on what resources are needed to transition from controlling malaria to eliminating it. Using
Philippines as an example, this study aimed to (1) estimate the financial resources used by sub-national malaria
programs in different phases during elimination and (2) understand how different environmental and organizational
factors may influence expenditure levels and spending proportions. The Philippines provides an opportunity to study
variations in sub-national programs because its epidemiological and ecological diversity, devolved health system,
and progressive elimination strategy all allow greater flexibility for lower-level governments to direct activities, but
also create challenges for coordination and resource mobilization. Through key informant interviews and archival
record retrieval in four selected provinces chosen based on eco-epidemiological variation, expenditures associated
with provincial malaria programs were collected for selected years (mid-1990s to 2010). Results show that
expenditures per person at risk per year decrease as programs progress from a state of controlled low-endemic
malaria to elimination to prevention of reintroduction regardless of whether elimination was deliberately planned.
However, wide variation across provinces were found: expenditures were generally higher if mainly financed with
donor grants, but were moderated by the level of economic development, the level of malaria transmission and
receptivity, and the capacity of program staff. Across all provinces, strong leadership appears to be a necessary
condition for maintaining progress and is vital in controlling outbreaks. While sampled provinces and years may not
be representative of other sub-national malaria programs, these findings suggest that the marginal yearly cost
declines with each phase during elimination.
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Introduction
In recent years, considerable progress has been made
toward reducing the global morbidity and mortality from malaria
[1]. Massive scale-up of malaria interventions—insecticide-
treated nets (ITNs), indoor residual spraying (IRS), and
increased access to diagnostics and effective treatment—in
addition to economic development and improved general
health care, have helped to reduce transmission in many
countries [1,2]. Many countries now have a goal of national or
subnational malaria elimination, defined as the interruption of
transmission in a specified geographic area resulting in zero
locally contracted cases [3].
Even though eliminating malaria from the endemic margins is
a part of the Global Malaria Action Plan [4], little guidance
exists on what resources are needed to transition from
controlling malaria to eliminating it. Little is known about
intervention mix needed to eliminate transmission once a state
of controlled-low endemic malaria (CLM) has been achieved, or
when malaria is no longer a major public health threat [5]. Even
less is known about the financial inputs needed to reposition a
program from control to elimination and prevention of
reintroduction (POR), despite the fact that many countries will
be confronted with these programmatic decisions as malaria
further declines.
To understand the financial resources needed for malaria
elimination, a retrospective case study was conducted of
provincial malaria programs in the Philippines. In selected
provinces with diverse eco-epidemiological environments, the
aim was to document the interventions used at various stages
of elimination and their costs, and determine the marginal cost
per year between phases of elimination. Variations in
expenditures per year across provinces were compared in
relation to malaria burden levels and local epidemiology,
geography and economic development in the area, sources of
program financing, organizational structure and capacity, and
the degree to which malaria elimination was an active pursuit.
Table 1 summarizes the key findings of the study. Along with
broader implications for national malaria control programs in
other countries, insights for furthering the Philippines’ sub-
national elimination strategy are discussed.
Background on malaria control in the Philippines
The Philippines has recently experienced a substantial
reduction in annual malaria caseload, from over 36,000
indigenous cases in 2000 to fewer than 15,000 in 2011. As of
2012, 25% of the country’s population was living in malaria-free
areas (areas with zero indigenous cases, or cases that do not
to have a local origin), with another 73% residing in areas of
low transmission (<1 case per 1,000 population), and the
remaining 2% resides in areas of high transmission (>1 case
per 1,000 population) [6]. The National Malaria Control
Program (NMCP) aims to achieve zero malaria deaths to zero
by 2014 and countrywide malaria elimination by 2020 [7].
With over 7,000 islands in the Philippines, each unique in
geography, ecology, sociopolitical situation, and malaria
epidemiology, a national strategy of progressive malaria
elimination allows local programs to custom-tailor interventions
to each province’s needs, supported by a certification process
to verify the achievement of elimination in each. Further, the
public health system is highly devolved in which local
government units (LGUs; includes provincial, municipal, and
barangay or neighborhood/village levels) are tasked with
program implementation. In 1993, the vertical malaria program
under the National Department of Health (DOH) was
decentralized, making provincial and municipal governments
responsible for managing their own programs and financing a
portion of their activities, supplemented with DOH budget
outlays (see Figure 1 for an organizational depiction). Thus far,
LGU capacity to take on program responsibility varies widely,
and program decisions can still come from the DOH where
local health systems lack experience [8].
The Philippines has also experienced increases in population
health and economic development in recent years. Gross
domestic product per capita has doubled in the past decade,
from US$966 in 2001 to US$2,370 billion in 2011.
Concurrently, life expectancy at birth has increased from 66.9
years to 68.8 years, and infant mortality has declined from 28.4
deaths per 1000 live births to 20.2 deaths per 1000 live births
[9].
At the same time, malaria has been progressively eliminated.
Figure 2 displays the decline in number of indigenous cases
reported (confirmed and clinically diagnosed) between 2005
and 2011, and Table 2 defines the level of endemicity
classifications across provinces and the number of provinces in
each as of 2010. However, the sustainability of malaria
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program funding is currently threatened. Financial support for
malaria from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (GFATM) may not be renewed beyond 2014 under
revised grant allocation criteria. Therefore, an in-depth
understanding of the experiences and financial resources used
by provinces that have recently embarked on or achieved
elimination is needed to inform future strategic planning.
Methods
This case study employed a variety of qualitative
approaches, including historical record review, key informant
interviews, and extraction of expenditure data from program
accounts.
Ethics statement
Approval for this study was obtained from institutional review
boards of the University of California, San Francisco
(12-08953), Western Pacific Regional Office of the World
Health Organization (2012.08.PHL.01.MVP), and the
Philippines DOH (DREC201202).
Sample selection
Four provinces on Luzon, the largest island in the Philippines
archipelago, were chosen to represent a range of malaria eco-
epidemiological environments and programs in different phases
of malaria elimination. The selected provinces are denoted in
Figure 2; in 2011, Benguet and Cavite were officially
considered malaria-free while Apayao and Laguna were still
Figure 1.  Philippines Health System Organization.  Under the decentralized, or devolved, health system, technical assistance,
policies, and guidelines for malaria control disseminate from the National Department of Health (DOH) to the Provincial Health
Offices via Regional Centers for Health Development (CHD) and DOH representatives positioned in extension offices at the
provincial level. Information and technical assistance is further propagated by provincial health office staff who conduct trainings and
oversee malaria control activities at the municipal and barangay levels with the participation of DOH representatives. While some
funding does flow downward from national, every government unit is expected to provide financial support for malaria activities
occurring at its respective level. The Provincial Health Office serves as point of entry for external funding organizations, including
Global Fund.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073352.g001
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progressing toward elimination. Because the NMCP shifted the
national strategy from control to elimination in 2008 [7],
provinces earlier declared malaria-free achieved this status
without deliberately pursing elimination (i.e. Benguet and
Cavite), whereas current provincial programs with low
transmission are actively pursuing elimination as a goal (i.e.
Apayao and Laguna).
Sampled years in each province were chosen based on the
completeness of available records, representation of different
program phases, and key events (e.g. an outbreak). The
phases of elimination were defined according to a mix of
criteria from WHO [3], Cohen et al. [5], and the Philippines
DOH [7] where applicable:
Controlled low-endemic malaria (CLM): interventions have
reduced endemic malaria transmission to such low levels that it
does not constitute a major public health burden [5]; typically
between <5 cases/1000 per population at risk per year (PPY)
and 1 case/1000 PPY [3].
Elimination: interventions have interrupted endemic
transmission and limited onward transmission from imported
infections below a threshold at which risk of reestablishment is
minimized [5]; typically when indigenous cases are below
1/1000 PPY [3].
Prevention of reintroduction: zero indigenous cases are
maintained [3]; provinces are certified malaria-free if no
indigenous cases arise for five consecutive years [7].
Data collection
From June to September 2012, researchers went to selected
provinces to conduct key informant interviews and retrieve
records on program expenditures, intervention coverage, and
epidemiological indicators. In each province, current and
former health workers from government, hospitals, and private
sector organizations with relevant experience and knowledge
of the malaria program were identified as potential key
informants. Interviews and data collection began at the regional
level, followed by visits to provincial, municipal, and barangay
health offices. Hospitals were also included if staff were
involved in case management and diagnosis, but treatment and
case follow-up are largely conducted by dedicated malaria
personnel out of LGU health offices. A total of 54 key
informants were interviewed.
After obtaining written informed consent, interviewers
followed a semi-structured questionnaire, asking about the
history of the malaria program, epidemiological trends,
organizational structure, operations, and activities. At the end
of each interview, key informants were asked to identify other
individuals who would be knowledgeable about the covered
Figure 2.  Malaria Burden Stratification in 2005 and 2011.  Malaria burden across provinces in the Philippines are stratified
based on the number of indigenous cases reported each year. Between 2005 and 2011, malaria cases have declined in many
provinces. In the selected case study provinces, cases have declined in Apayao, Benguet, and Laguna. Cavite are Benguet are
certified to be malaria-free according to the Philippines subnational malaria elimination certification standards.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073352.g002
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topics. Interviews were conducted in either English or Tagalog
and tape-recorded for transcription and translation. A second
semi-structured questionnaire was followed to identify malaria
program expenditures and financial records for program
activities. To the extent possible, expenditure records on
personnel, commodities, services, and capital equipment were
collected for all malaria activities in the sampled years. Key
indicators for malaria epidemiology, intervention coverage, and
population data were collated from multiple sources and
databases (i.e. the Field Health Service Information System,
the Philippines Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response
System, the Philippines Malaria Information System, and
annual health reports, and operational plans). There were
many gaps in epidemiological data, including indigenous and
imported cases on national and provincial level, and
intervention coverage information. All available data sources
were accessed and triangulated when possible, but there may
be some underreporting. For additional details on interview
processes, transcript coding, and expenditure calculations,
please see Appendix S1.
To account for differences in service delivery needs across
provinces, total yearly expenditures are adjusted by the
population at risk (PAR), defined as the total population
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residing within a barangay or sub-barangay unit that are not
certified malaria-free (i.e. have had some amount of indigenous
malaria cases in the past five years) per standard procedures
of the DOH at the time. To ensure consistency, the geographic
area units, boundaries, and definition used to identify PAR by
the NMCP in the first selected sampled year for each province
are applied to all subsequent years, adjusted for population
growth if actual counts were not available.
Data analysis
Interview transcriptions were analyzed using Atlas.ti 6.2. A
coding scheme was developed to identify common themes,
including ecology and environment, risk groups, program
strategies and interventions, financial and human resources,
challenges and success factors.
Expenditure data were organized and analyzed across three
dimensions:
1. funding source: local (barangay and municipal),
provincial, or national government, non-governmental and
donor agencies, and in-kind contributions;
2. malaria activity: diagnosis and treatment, prevention and
vector control, surveillance, information and education
campaigns (IEC), and program management and
monitoring and evaluation (M/M&E); and
3. expenditure type: personnel, commodities, services, and
capital equipment.
Private individual and household expenditures were not
captured. All expenditures were adjusted to 2010 prices and
converted to US dollars.
Personnel data were further tabulated to construct a staffing
ratio measure, calculated by dividing the raw count of malaria
personnel by the full-time employee (FTE) equivalent (i.e.
staffing ratio = number of reported people working on malaria /
number needed if all employees were working full time). The
staffing ratio thus reflects the degree of dispersion in time
allocation across individuals. Hence, a low staff ratio of 2 would
reflect a higher proportion of time spent on malaria per person
across fewer people, or four people each spending 50% of their
time on malaria, equivalent to two FTEs (i.e. 2= 4 people/2
FTE). Conversely, a high staff ratio of 10 would reflect a lower
proportion of time spent on malaria per person across a
relatively higher number people, or 20 people each spending
10% of their time on malaria, again equivalent to two FTEs (i.e.
10=20 people/2 FTE).
Results
Findings for each province are presented below, followed by
a comparison of results across provinces.
Apayao province
All seven municipalities in Apayao are considered malaria
endemic. Service delivery is more difficult given the
mountainous terrain, limited infrastructure, and presence of
highly mobile indigenous groups. Throughout the 1990s,
annual caseload was in the thousands with peaks every four
years (see Figure 3, Panel A). The malaria program was
Costs of Malaria Elimination in the Philippines
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vertically structured until 2005, but insufficient resources from
the DOH resulted in sporadic IRS. The program was devolved
when funding from the GFATM in 2005 enabled capacity
building for local staff and expanded access to care via
microscopy centers established in remote barangays, staffed
by trained, volunteer barangay health workers. Community
volunteers assisted in IEC and stream-clearing activities, and
IRS, ITN, and malaria drug distribution were all scaled up. The
number of indigenous cases declined from a high of 3,503 (API
(annual parasite index)=35.45 per 1000 PAR) in 2002 to 246
(API=2.37 per 1000 PAR) in 2007. The program goal was
shifted toward elimination in 2009, the year when only 11
indigenous cases occurred. As the malaria burden declined,
the dominant parasite species shifted from Plasmodium
falciparum (Pf) to Plasmodium vivax (Pv), with Pf accounting
for 76% of cases in 2006 but only 24% in 2009 (M. Rebueno-
Trudeau, personal communication, July 8, 2012).
Yearly program expenditures were captured for the last two
years of CLM (2007 and 2008) and the first year of
reorientation for elimination (2009). Total expenditures,
expenditures per PAR per year (PPY), and funding and staffing
allocations are summarized in Table 3. Expenditures declined
each year from a high of US$7.21 PPY in 2007 to US$3.28
PPY in 2009. While the GFATM accounted for the vast majority
of spent funds, LGU yearly contributions also increased, as
cost sharing from municipalities was required by GFATM.
Provincial and national contributions were minimal and went
toward personnel. Spending on diagnosis and treatment
declined each year as RDTs and the retreatment of older ITNs
were discontinued, and spending on personnel increased in
2009 when the program was reoriented toward elimination.
Overall, vector control dominated program spending. Figure
4, Panel A displays yearly spending levels and proportions
across program activities. In 2007, 51% of all expenditures
Figure 3.  Malaria Cases for Selected Provinces of the Philippines.  The number of indigenous and imported (when available)
cases for each selected province is displayed, along with key programmatic events.
Notes: (A) imported cases are not available; 100% long-lasting insecticide net (LLIN) coverage is defined as one net per 2.5
persons. (B) Imported cases are largely undocumented for this time period; the program was devolved to Local Government Units
(LGUs) in 2006. (C) Cases from 1986-1999 were from both P. vivax and P. falciparum; all cases from 1999-2001 were from P.
vivax. (D) Three cases occurred from July 2003-August 2004 that cannot be attributed to a single year and thus are not included;
data are not available for 1996-1998, 2005, and 2007-2011. LGU = Local Government Unit.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073352.g003
Costs of Malaria Elimination in the Philippines
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e73352
went toward prevention and vector control (i.e. ITN retreatment,
LLIN distribution, and biannual IRS), declining to an average of
41% across 2008 and 2009 as LLIN coverage reached 100% in
2009, and ITN retreatment and IRS were scaled down.
Correspondingly, spending on consumables declined (from
63% in 2007 to 50% in 2008/2009) and spending on M/M&E
increased from 21% in 2007 to above 30% in later years.
Laguna province
Before economic development and urbanization began in
Laguna, malaria was endemic throughout the province.
Indigenous cases numbered in the thousands and epidemic
peaks occurred biennially in the late 1980s (see Figure 3,
Panel B). During this time, vector control measures were
sporadic, primarily used only in response to a rise in cases.
Industrialization began in the 1990s, and waterways near
construction areas became polluted. Key informants cited this
as a potential cause for the reduction of mosquito-breeding
habitats, followed by a sharp drop in annual cases. Continued
development, along with focal vector control activities and
prompt case management, helped to further reduce indigenous
cases to zero in the early 2000s when malaria activities were
discontinued and nearly all malaria program staff were
reassigned. Indigenous cases remained zero until three Pv
infections were detected in 2006, followed by an outbreak of
256 cases, the majority due to Pf (59%) in 2007 (G. Dela Cruz
& R. Palos, personal communication, July 24, 2012).
Yearly program expenditures were captured from 2006 to
2010 (Figure 3, Panel B). Expenditures of US$3.26 PPY in
2006 mainly went toward personnel time on M/M&E (37%) and
vector control (26%) at sites where cases occurred, mainly
Table 3. Malaria Expenditures, Population at Risk, Cases, Funding Sources, Activities, and Personnel Time Across Study
Provinces.
  Apayao    Laguna    Cavite  Benguet  
 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1998 2000 2007 2004 2008
Program phase1 CLM CLM E E E/OB E/OB E E CLM CLM/E POR E POR
Population at risk2 103,633 106,642 109,742 8,532 8,760 8,995 9,236 8,892 9,814 13,101 11,033 5,841 6,325
Indigenous malaria cases3 246 35 11 3 256 9 4 7 24 3 0 0 N/A
Imported malaria cases3 0 0 0 2 4 N/A N/A N/A 22 1 3 12 N/A
Total expenditures4 $747,368 $570,603 $360,114 $27,844 $103,537 $110,093 $40,699 $43,562 $42,484 $23,575 $6,986 $16,185 $15,931
Expenditures per PAR4 $7.21 $5.35 $3.28 $3.26 $11.82 $12.24 $4.41 $4.90 $4.33 $1.81 $0.63 $2.77 $2.52
Funding sources              
Local government 14.9% 16.5% 23.9% 78.8% 42.2% 33.2% 69.7% 49.6% 29.7% 34.4% 59.1% 49.5% 48.2%
Provincial government 3.9% 4.1% 5.5% 7.8% 18.9% 11.3% 13.3% 31.5% <1% <1% 15.4 18.3% 15.2%
National government 1.7% 1.8% 2.5% 13.1% 38.8% 55.4% 16.8% 18.9% 70.3% 65.5% 25.6% 26.4% 26.7%
Global Fund 79.5% 77.4% 68.0% - - - - - - - - - -
Other <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% - - - 5.8% 9.8%
Malaria activities              
Diagnosis & Treatment 18.3% 12.6% 13.2% 12.5% 15.7% 7.1% 12.7% 10.6% 7.8% 4.1% <1% 14.2% 16.5%
Prev & Vector Control 50.8% 41.6% 40.5% 26.2% 52.2% 66.6% 32.5% 45.8% 28.1% 30.4% - 3.4% 3.5%
Surveillance 4.2% 4.6% 5.7% 15.3% 8.4% 5.7% 14.7% 8.7% 36.2% 43.7% 20.1% 46.6% 46.7%
IEC5 5.9% 7.6% 7.7% 8.8% 6.7% 5.5% 8.5% 5.5% 6.6% 13.1% 48.6% 21.4% 21.2%
Management/M&E6 20.8% 33.7% 32.9% 37.2% 17.0% 15.2% 31.8% 29.4% 21.4% 8.7% 31.3% 14.4% 12.1%
Personnel              
% of total expenditures 20.3% 24.3% 31.8% 95.2% 59.1% 46.3% 85.2% 63.4% 88.7% 79.8% 100.0% 91.4% 90.2%
Count 123 121 16 28 61 36 34 33 13 11 12 29 30
FTE equivalent7 33.33 30.66 8.25 5.68 14.40 11.29 6.70 4.33 5.86 3.47 1.04 2.85 2.86
Staffing ratio8 3.69 3.95 1.94 4.93 4.24 3.19 5.07 7.62 2.22 3.17 11.59 10.18 10.49
1. CLM = controlled low-endemic malaria; E = elimination; OB = outbreak; POR = prevention of reintroduction.
2. Population at risk (PAR) is defined as the total population residing in endemic barangays/municipalities. For Apayao, all municipalities are endemic. For Laguna, the
endemic municipalities are San Gregorio, Ala minos; Santiago II, San Pablo City; Bautista,and San Pablo City. For Benguet, the endemic municipalities are Itogon, Sablan,
and Tuba; PAR figures for 2008 are projected from 2004 PAR based on the provincial population growth rate as none of the population are considered at risk after malaria-
free certification. For Cavite, the endemic municipalities are Maragondon, Silang and Ternate.
3. N/A = No applicable records were found.
4. All expenditures are adjusted to 2010 USD.
5. IEC = Information and Education Campaign
6. M & E = Monitoring and Evaluation
7. Total time allocation for all malaria personnel are converted to the equivalent hours of a full-time employee (FTE).
8. The staffing ratio is derived by dividing the personnel count by the FTE equivalent.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073352.t003
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financed by the responsible local health offices (see Table 3).
Even though implementation duties had been devolved, local
program personnel lacked experience and training to manage
the outbreak in 2007. Expenditures rose to US$11.82 PPY in
2007 and peaked at US$12.24 PPY in 2008 when the outbreak
was contained, corresponding to increased resources from the
national government to bring in regional malaria employees
(extensions of the DOH) to lead and train local staff. The
greatest share of spending went toward IRS and ITN
distribution for outbreak containment (52% in 2007 and 67% in
2008). By 2008, 100% coverage among the population at risk
for IEC and IRS in endemic areas was achieved and 100%
coverage of LLINs distribution was reached in 2010. Trained
local staff assumed all duties and the focus shifted to
surveillance and maintaining zero indigenous cases to achieve
malaria-free certification as evidenced by personnel spending
as the largest share of program outlays (63%).
Cavite province
Indigenous malaria caseload in Cavite has historically been
low, confined to three endemic municipalities (Maragondon,
Ternate, and Silang). According to available records, the
highest number of indigenous cases, comprised of both Pf and
Pv (77), was reported in 1987, declining to about 20 in the late
1990s (see Figure 3, Panel C), with Pv responsible for the last
documented cases from 1998 to 2000 [10,12]. The proximity to
Metro Manila has spurred urbanization since 1998 [11,12] and
construction has polluted waterways and reduced vector
breeding sites (primarily for Anopheles flavirostris) [11]. In
2001, indigenous and imported cases plummeted to zero and
remained at zero through to certification of malaria-free status
in 2006. Since endemicity was naturally low, the few activities
of the malaria program were run primarily by regional malaria
personnel and never formally devolved.
Figure 4.  Malaria Program Expenditures for Selected Provinces of the Philippines.  Total program expenditures by type of
activity are displayed for each selected province for selected years, along with the number of indigenous and imported (when
available) cases. The percent allocation for the two largest spending categories are given next to each bar.
Notes: M/M&E = Management and Monitoring and Evaluation; IEC = Information and education campaign; Prev/Vector =
Prevention and vector control; Diag/Treat = Diagnosis and treatment.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073352.g004
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Total expenditures declined for each selected year—from US
$4.33 PPY in 1998 when the program was in the CLM phase,
to US$1.81 PPY in 2000 when cases further declined to levels
corresponding to elimination, to US$0.63 PPY in 2007, the first
year of POR. Before malaria-free certification, regional staff
conducted nearly all activities and funding mainly came from
DOH (see Table 3; 70% in 1998, 66% in 2000). According to
available program coverage indicators, IRS and ITN distribution
and retreatment reached 100% coverage by 1998. Surveillance
activities, the highest share of spending in 1998 (36%) and
2000 (44%), included passive and active case detection and
mass blood surveys in suspected high transmission areas (e.g.
construction sites and military camps that employed transient
workers from other endemic provinces). LGUs provided salary
support for midwives and health officers trained to collect blood
smears. By 2007, nearly all spending went toward personnel
with 59% coming from LGUs and only 26% from the national
government. After malaria-free certification, all former regional
malaria personnel were reassigned, retaining only minimal
malaria M/M&E responsibilities for overseeing case detection
(31% of total) while midwives in LGUs continued malaria IEC
integrated with dengue (49%).
Benguet province
Available records indicate that Benguet has had three
endemic municipalities (Itogon, Tuba and Sablan) since the
early 1990s (see Figure 3, Panel D). The last indigenous
cases, all caused by Pv, occurred in 1992 (API=0.4 per 1000
PAR); however, resumption of local transmission is a possibility
due to imported cases among migrant agricultural and mining
workers from nearby endemic provinces (Local Government of
Benguet 2012). NMCP records show that 98 imported cases
were detected in 1992, falling to under 20 in the early 2000s;
malaria records were not kept after Benguet was certified
malaria-free in 2005 [13] (S. Puyao, personal communication,
October 28, 2012).
Expenditure records were compiled for 2004, the year prior
to certification, and 2008, representative of ongoing POR. In
both years, no indigenous cases were detected and total
program expenditures were constant: US$2.77 PPY in 2004
and US$2.52 PPY in 2008 (see Table 3). According to key
informants, ongoing surveillance (47%) is considered vital for
maintaining malaria-free status since vectors are still present
according to entomological surveys [13]. Personnel at LGUs
and the Provincial Health Team Office (PHTO) are integrated
into other vector-borne or infectious disease programs. In both
selected years, the 90% of spending on personnel supports 30
individuals working on malaria each year; each person spends
an average of 10% of their time on malaria-specific activities
(see Table 3). Because of rough terrain and poor infrastructure,
the program heavily relies on local health offices for
surveillance and disease-integrated IEC (21%).
Looking across provinces and phases
Supplemented with key informant responses and literature
review, a qualitative analysis was conducted to compare
program expenditures across provinces. Several factors
emerged to help explain the relative program spending levels
and proportions across provinces and phases: differences in
malaria burden and epidemiology, geography and level of
economic development, sources of financing, organizational
structure and capacity, and the degree to which malaria
elimination was an active pursuit rather than a passive result of
external factors and continued malaria control efforts. These
characteristics are summarized in Table 4.
With the exception of outbreak in Laguna, program
expenditures PPY decline through each phase of CLM,
elimination, and POR. Among selected CLM years,
expenditures PPY were higher in Apayao than in Cavite,
commensurate with a higher malaria burden in Apayao,
ecology hospitable to mosquito vectors, little economic
development and infrastructure, and more diverse ethnic
groups that require tailored interventions. For example,
indigenous groups, such as the Aeta, are highly mobile and live
in temporary structures with partial walls, making regular IRS
and ITN/LLIN distribution difficult, and IEC must be customized
for different dialects and low literacy. Higher spending levels in
Apayao may also reflect larger resources provided by GFATM
grants that enable purchasing of more capital equipment, but
that also require more donor-specific reporting. Further, a
heavier emphasis on commodity purchases accounts for the
large share of spending for prevention and vector control (51%
in 2007; 42% in 2008) compared to surveillance (6% in 2007;
8% in 2008). The program in Apayao also illustrates the
importance of LGU political support: while donor funds enabled
the program to formally devolve and rapidly scale-up, it also
created resentment among LGU leaders that undermined
implementation until the arrival of a new, supportive governor.
In contrast, the program in Cavite was wholly domestically
financed, and lower expenditures may also reflect spending for
minimum necessities. For example, most equipment were
beyond ‘useful life years’ as defined by accounting standards
[14] and shared across multiple health programs. Commodities
accounted for a lower proportion due to a greater emphasis on
surveillance (36%) over prevention and vector control (28%).
Moreover, because the program in Cavite was never formally
devolved, no additional resources for training LGU staff were
needed.
Expenditures PPY during the elimination phase are fairly
comparable between those observed for Laguna in 2006 and
for Apayao in 2009, years in which only a handful of indigenous
cases were identified in both provinces. Although Laguna has
experienced more industrialization than Apayao, border areas
in Laguna where cases occurred in 2006 and in 2007-2008
outbreak are similarly difficult to access where marginalized
groups reside (i.e. militia camps). In elimination years after the
outbreak in Laguna, spending levels and allocations returned to
pre-outbreak levels (US$3.26 PPY in 2006 compared to US
$4.41 and US$4.90 PPY in 2009 and 2010, respectively). As
both provinces are actively pursuing elimination, spending on
prevention and vector control is larger than on surveillance
activities.
The events in Laguna further provide an example of the
relative resources required to stem and manage an outbreak
(2007-2008). Expenditures PPY increased four-fold during
outbreak years. In the absence of cases, the gap in expertise
Costs of Malaria Elimination in the Philippines
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left when regional malaria staff were released in 2000 was not
immediately felt. However, when neighboring provinces
received GFATM support in 2006, all provinces in the region
were formally devolved, including non-recipient provinces,
leaving malaria program responsibilities in the hands of
inexperienced LGU staff in Laguna. When the outbreak
occurred, this human resource vacuum was filled by recruiting
former regional workers and rapidly training local staff, largely
financed by the national government. Due to resource
constraints post-outbreak, IRS was discontinued in 2009 and
active surveillance in 2010, with only “essential” staff sent for
malaria trainings—a confluence of factors similar to those that
precipitated the outbreak.
In sampled POR years, expenditures in Benguet were over
four times as high as those in Cavite. While both provinces
have similarly low receptivity for malaria transmission, the cost
of delivering IEC and surveillance services in Benguet is likely
greater due to accessibility challenges in reaching remote
areas where migrants from malaria endemic provinces work.
Key informants in both provinces (and in Laguna) stated,
however, that greater resources are needed to improve
outbreak response measures, increase surveillance vigilance
along border areas, and maintain local malaria capacity.
Without LGU financial reserves, emergency response may be
hindered should cases be detected, and programs must rely on
support from regional offices.
Thus, an adequate knowledge and capacity among program
personnel are key components of successful malaria programs.
Across phase transitions, the proportion of spending on
personnel increased. Whereas only 20% of total program
expenses went toward personnel in Apayao during the earliest
control year (i.e. 2007), it increases to 32% by 2009. In post-
outbreak elimination years in Laguna, this percentage is over
60%. During elimination and POR years, personnel
expenditures ranged between 80 and 100% in Cavite and
Benguet. Greater spending on personnel also reflects the need
for robust surveillance activities that rely heavily on the skills of
front-line health workers for case detection.
Across phases, there are also distinct trends in staffing
numbers and time allocation as cases decline (see Table 3). As
expected, there is an overall decline in staff time and numbers
allocated to malaria across phases. Notably, however, there is
also a decline in staff ratios. Figure 5 plots the staffing ratios
against the logged number of indigenous cases for each
province-year data point. During control years, staffing ratios
are low, reflecting relatively fewer numbers of staff that each
spends a larger percentage of time on malaria. As the number
of indigenous cases declines, the staffing ratio also declines
and there is a move toward having relatively larger numbers of
staff each spending small percentages of time on malaria.
These staffing ratios may also reflect increased integration of
malaria into other disease programs. For CLM program years,
workers spent an average of 32% of their time on malaria,
which declines to 26% for non-outbreak, elimination program
years, and further to 9% for POR program years.
Discussion
To assist policymakers and program managers in planning
for malaria elimination, we sought to estimate the yearly
resources that malaria programs in four selected provinces—
Apayao, Benguet, Cavite, and Laguna—used during different
phases of elimination. With the exception of outbreak in
Laguna, overall expenditures PPY decrease in each phase
from CLM to elimination to POR. Expenditures during CLM
phases ranged from US$1.81 to US$7.21 PPY. Elimination
phase expenditures ranged from US$2.77 to US$12.24 PPY,
with the latter figure associated with the management of an
outbreak. Provinces that are currently malaria-free and that did
not have a deliberate goal to eliminate spent the least overall
across all phases. In these eliminated provinces, expenditures
associated with POR ranged from US$0.63 to US$2.77 PPY.
Qualitatively, variations in expenditures PPY across
provinces appear to be associated with differences in
geography and level of economic development, programs’
sources of financing, their organizational structure and
capacity, and the degree to which malaria elimination is
actively pursued (see Table 4). The costs of service delivery
partially reflect the additional resources needed to reach
remote and less developed areas. Expenditures PPY for POR
are nearly four times higher in Benguet, when compared to
Cavite, related to surveillance and IEC efforts that must reach
migrant workers in distant areas bordering endemic neighbor
provinces. Similarly, local housing styles and language
barriers, such as those among Apayao’s ethnic groups,
challenge IRS, ITN/LLIN, and IEC roll out, substantially
increasing costs. Other studies find similar trends. For
example, malaria expenditures for Vanuatu and the Solomon
Islands, when adjusted by a remoteness and incapacity index
(which accounts for population dispersion, travel distance, time,
and accessibility) decline by a factor of 31 and 14, respectively
[15]. Thus, program planning should account for greater
resource needs for reaching vulnerable populations located in
remote areas, rather than applying blanket formulas based on
per-person unit costs.
Even though devolution of the malaria program
responsibilities to LGUs was officially launched in 1993, the
process and timeline for transferring duties varied across
provinces. This process, while presenting opportunities for
LGUs to take on greater leadership, exposed programs to
greater risk if local staff were not adequately equipped to take
on additional tasks. LGU capacity in Apayao was increased
with additional resources from GFATM grants to support
personnel training and formally devolve the malaria program.
However, because GFATM assistance also triggered
devolution in neighboring non-funded provinces, the risks
associated with the lack of LGU capacity under a devolved
organization was exposed in Laguna’s 2007 outbreak. These
experiences highlight the need to build and maintain strong
leadership and expertise within provincial malaria programs in
a devolved system.
While donor assistance can add much-needed resources, it
may also influence strategy and intervention choices, which
may not necessarily be most efficient. The experience in
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Apayao shows that, even with large external financing, the
transition between CLM and elimination can be made with
decreasing marginal costs. However, this may not be the norm
for other situations. For example, the Swaziland government
spent an average of $4.57 PPY during CLM (2004-2008), but
budgeted amounts for elimination rose dramatically to $12.88
PPY (2009-2013), a transition that is accompanied by an
increase in external financing from 32% to 71% [16]. In both
places, the influx of GFATM funding is accompanied by
relatively greater spending on commodities for prevention and
vector control and less on surveillance activities. In contrast,
the program in Cavite, which was nearly all domestically
financed during years when malaria was declining, spent
relatively more on surveillance compared to vector control and
still achieved and maintains zero indigenous cases.
Generally, as indigenous cases decline, the need for vector
control and prevention activities decreases and there is greater
emphasis on surveillance and IEC [1,17] as observed in all
study provinces. In particular, in both Laguna and Apayao,
spending on vector control dramatically reduces after 100%
coverage of LLINs for targeted populations is reached and
spending is largely comprised of personnel expenses for
surveillance, IEC, and M/M&E. In addition, there is a general
trend toward leveraging more numbers of personnel each
working fewer hours on malaria activities during the later
stages of elimination and POR. This staff allocation may reflect
the need to have greater awareness and vigilance among
larger numbers of public health personnel, who each spend a
small amount of time monitoring the malaria situation. Wider
coverage may also mean that cases can be detected more
readily, such as through barangay health workers stationed in
high risk areas.
Although there has been much attention paid to scaling up
malaria control efforts, few studies have shown the financial
resources required for malaria elimination. A handful of
estimates are available for experiences during the Global
Malaria Eradication Programme (1955-1970) (for a review, see
18), but it is unclear how relevant these are to the current
environment as malaria burden has changed and new tools
and challenges have surfaced [1,19]. Recently, a model
simulation of program costs from five places (Hainan and
Jiangsu provinces in China, Mauritius, Swaziland, and
Zanzibar) shows that the cumulative costs for elimination is
equal to or higher than those for maintaining malaria as very
low levels indefinitely [16]. While this study was not able to
document cumulative costs across phases, selected PPY
Figure 5.  Staffing Ratios by Indigenous Caseload.  Staffing ratios are calculated by dividing the raw count of personnel by the
full-time equivalent (FTE) of the sum of all personnel time spent on malaria (i.e. staffing ratio = number of reported people working
on malaria / number needed if all employees were working full time). A staffing ratio is calculated for each province-year observation
and plotted according to the logged number of indigenous cases if the number of cases is greater than zero. For province-years
where zero indigenous cases are recorded, points are plotted on the vertical axis itself.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073352.g005
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expenditures show consistent declining yearly marginal costs
across phases (with the exception of outbreak situations),
corroborating findings from similar case studies. Program
expenditures from Mauritius show that costs declined from US
$5.39 to US$2.80 PPY during elimination, and further to US
$2.09 PPY for POR [20]. Total expenditures in two districts in
Sri Lanka for years representing later stages of malaria control
(i.e moving from a high level of control to a state of CLM) also
showed declining or stable expenditures: in 2004 and 2008,
costs in Anuradhapura declined from US$1.57 to US$0.81
PPY, respectively, but costs in Kurunegala were constant at
US$1.94 and US$1.84 PPY, respectively [21].
Limitations
With the retrospective data capture, some cost components
are estimated based on key informant input and standard
commodity unit costs where expenditure records were not
available. Thus, reported expenditure levels are only indicative
of the magnitude of true costs. Additionally, full economic costs
are not captured, but private direct and indirect costs are likely
to be very small due to the small number of cases occurring
during elimination. Lastly, we do not look at early years when
initial malaria interventions are first implemented or scaled up
in efforts to bring rampant malaria under control, which can
entail large amounts of financing and are necessary before
elimination can even occur.
It is unclear how generalizable these findings are to other
provinces in the Philippines as a purposeful sampling frame
was used and data availability was a deciding factor in
selecting sampled years. As such, expenditure data are meant
to describe general trends that can be understood from specific
illustrative examples rather than being used for budgeting
purposes. Similarly, results may not be generalizable to other
countries. Expenditures are standardized by PAR, but each
country may calculate PAR differently. Moreover, the pace of
economic development in relation to malaria program
implementation may moderate the speed at which marginal
costs may decline over time. This appeared to be
advantageous for some of the study provinces and limits the
degree to which conclusions can be applied to places
developing at a slower pace. Lastly, countries such as the
Philippines that have declared a national goal of malaria
elimination may have other advantages that lower costs
compared to countries where elimination may not be feasible
and prohibitively costly (e.g. Zanzibar, see 22).
However, the strengths, weaknesses, and experiences of the
selected provinces in the Philippines may provide country
program managers with insight in how to deal with similar
challenges and adequately plan for such situations in their local
context. Understanding how programs spend and allocate
resources, and the factors that moderate these choices, may
inform strategic planning and resource mobilization, particularly
in deciding which activities should be supported and how to
provide the necessary tools and personnel to ensure program
integrity.
While cost sharing and efficiency spending are desirable, this
case study of selected provinces in the Philippines indicates
there is a real risk that outbreaks may occur and may not be
effectively managed if there are large resource gaps—
particularly in available staff experience and expertise—that
may exist in a devolved health care system. As the GFATM
grant to the Philippines is set to finish in 2014, a concerted
effort to build local capacity in preparation for this transition
should be made to minimize risks due to program disruption or
gaps in human resources. Based on the program histories of
Laguna, Cavite, and Benguet in funding malaria activities in
elimination settings, Apayao LGUs should be able to take on
the financial responsibilities provided political will is sustained.
If this is the case across many of the higher-burden GFATM-
supported provinces, and if emerging cases of P. knowlesi
cases can be controlled [23], then the Philippines would be
well-positioned to continue to progressively eliminate malaria.
Moreover, there are national plans to establish regional hubs
that maintain stockpiles of equipment, drugs, and supplies and
could coordinate emergency response for provinces that may
not have the ability to quickly mobilize local resources [7].
Above all, maintaining a cadre of front-line workers who are
trained on malaria appears to be necessary for keeping
indigenous cases at or near zero.
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